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XENOPHON AND THE ALTERNATIVE TO REALIST FOREIGN POLICY: *CYROPAEDIA* 3.1.14-31*

Abstract: The dialogue Xenophon stages at *Cyropaedia* 3.1.14-31 constitutes a sophisticated theoretical treatment of Greek foreign-policy motivations and methods, and offers an implicit rebuttal to Thucydides' realist theses about foreign relations. Comparison of this passage to the historians and Attic orators suggests that Xenophon was attempting to systematize conventional Greek conceptions: the resulting theoretical system, in which *hybris* is regarded as the main obstacle to interstate quiet, and control of other states depends not only upon fear but upon superior excellence and the management of reciprocity, is likely to approach closer than Thucydides' theses to mainstream classical Greek thinking about foreign relations.

A single extended theoretical treatment of foreign relations survives from classical antiquity, although is not usually recognized as such. It is to be found in Xenophon's perplexing historical-novel-cum-guide-to-statesmanship, the *Cyropaedia*.[1] It takes the form of a debate that Xenophon stages between his main character, the young Cyrus the Great, and Tigranes, prince of Armenia, about what is to be done with the latter's rebellious father.[2] This debate is theoretical in two senses. First, because like so much in the *Cyropaedia*, it is didactic: just as the Greek reader can take away from the work lessons about how to command a Greek army, so he can take away from the debate between Cyrus and Tigranes a set of instructions about how to conduct Greek foreign affairs.[3] And second, because (unlike, say, the thoughts of Thucydides or Demosthenes) Xenophon's debate is wholly removed from the context of real events. The details of Cyrus' diplomacy were invented by Xenophon, and so the author has the freedom to present a systematic analysis of foreign relations: both to survey the motivations that drive states, and to rank and arrange those motivations into a system.[4]

The debate between Tigranes and Cyrus is a difficult passage. Its form is unusual, far closer to the cut and thrust of Thucydides' Melian dialogue than to Xenophon's usual one-sided 'Socratic' dialogues.[5] Here as elsewhere Xenophon expressed himself tersely, relying upon the knowledge and assumptions of his Greek reader. And the reader of the *Cyropaedia* must always be alert for *Perserie*. For the most part the characters in the work, notionally Persians and other

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[1] On which, recently, B. Due, *The* Cyropaedia. *Xenophon's Aims and Methods* (Aarhus 1989); J. Tatum, *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction. On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton 1989); D.L. Gera, *Xenophon's* Cyropaedia. *Style, Genre, and Literary Technique* (Oxford 1993); C. Mueller-Goldingen, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophons Kyrupädie* (Stuttgart 1995); C. Nadon, *Xenophon's Prince. Republic and Empire in the* Cyropaedia (Berkeley and Los Angeles 2001).

[2] Xen. *Cyr.* (hereafter '*Cyr.*') 3.1.14-31. M. Bizos, *Xénophon Cyropédie Tome II, Livres III-IV* (Paris 1973) 5-10, and Nadon (n.1) 79-83 read the arguments of Tigranes as feeble and absurd; Tatum (n.1) 134-45 and Gera (n.1) 78-98 read the dialogue as a sophistic diversion for Xenophon's reader. I argue against such dismissive readings below. Due (n.1) 223-5 takes it seriously, relating it loosely to the Athenian Empire; Mueller-Goldingen (n.1) 150-9 regards it as a serious Socratic discussion of ethics.

[3] For the relationship of Xenophon's didactic programme to the form of the work, P. Stadter, 'Fictional narrative in the *Cyropaedeia*', *AJP* 112 (1991) 461-91, esp. 464-7. For the military lessons in the *Cyropaedia*, H.R. Breitenbach, 'Xenophon', *RE* IXA.2 (1967) 1567-2051 at 1721-37 and J.K. Anderson, *Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1970) 165-91.

[4] For Tigranes as a fictional character, Breitenbach (n.3) 1712-13.

[5] For similarity to the Melian dialogue, Gera (n.1) 94-

easterners, think and act like Greeks. But sometimes the Persian literary frame intrudes.[6] Finally, Xenophon's assumptions about the conduct of foreign affairs are alien to our own. So the debate between Cyrus and Tigranes must be explicated, first by resort to other passages of the *Cyropaedia* (for Xenophon's lessons about foreign affairs are hardly confined to the debate in Book 3), then by resort to Xenophon's other works, and finally by comparison to Greek historical works and oratory, to get a sense of Xenophon's place in the broader world of Greek thinking about relations between states, and a sense of what he did with the concepts he inherited.

The reward is a vision of Greek foreign affairs far closer to that found in most other Greek authors – and so presumably in the minds of most Greeks – than the celebrated fear-and-power doctrine of Thucydides.[7] Xenophon was not the Man on the Acharnae Omnibus, and cannot simply be assumed to represent conventional Greek or Athenian thinking; the reader must always be alert for the influence of his extreme political opinions, his love of Sparta, and his eccentric individuality. But other authors offer abundant parallels for most of Xenophon's ways of thinking about foreign affairs. Xenophon reaches into other realms of life for material with which to assemble his vision of relations between states, calling not only upon the (now much-studied) 'domestic metaphors' of the *polis* as aristocratic household with its slaves and supportive kindred, its friends (*philoi*) and guest-friends (*xenoi*), its enemies and vengeances, but also upon Greek understandings of ethics, rulership and psychology, this last closely related to Greek understanding of morale in battle. And in Xenophon we witness – in contrast to, and perhaps even in reply to, Thucydides' pessimistic power-and-fear realism – a triumph of idealism. In Xenophon ideas and ethics and culture matter: they do not exist merely as a veil to be whisked away, revealing the dark engines of power beneath. Nor do ideals in the *Cyropaedia* – as in Thucydides – crumble in the face of strife and want. While the *Cyropaedia* can hardly be the key to deciding whether realist imperatives or cultural ideals were dominant in the day-to-day conduct of ancient foreign affairs (a question roiling scholarship),[8] it can at least offer insight into how a Greek other than Thucydides might have answered that question were it posed to him, and, perhaps most interesting, how a Greek might try to integrate realist and idealist strains of thinking.

CYRUS AND TIGRANES: XENOPHON'S PROGRAMME FOR DOMINATION

Xenophon casts his theory of foreign relations as a programme for domination: a set of principles whereby one state can establish enduring control over others. This fits well within the overt purpose of the *Cyropaedia*, a work prompted (Xenophon tells his reader at the outset) by a desire to investigate how Cyrus had managed to conquer and rule so great an empire. But that interest, in turn, was driven by Xenophon's sense of the political confusion of his own Greece (1.1.1-6). Xenophon hardly offered a detailed treatment of domination in order to assist his Greek reader should he unexpectedly find himself appointed Great King of Persia. Xenophon's theory, rather, grows out of his sense that the instability of domination was the crucial problem facing the

[6] The degree to which the *Cyropaedia* conveys authentic information about the Persians is controversial: C.J. Tuplin, 'Persian décor in *Cyropaedia* [*sic*]: some observations', in H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg and J.W. Drijvers (eds), *Achaemenid History* 5: *The Roots of the European Tradition* (Leiden 1990) 17-29, takes a minimalist view; S.W. Hirsch, *The Friendship of the Barbarians* (Hanover, NH 1985) 61-134, argues that it contains more than classicists usually believe. But no one thinks that the motivations of the characters are anything but Greek.

[7] For up-to-date overviews of Greek foreign relations, see J.M. Hall, 'International relations in Archaic and Classical Greece', in P. Sabin, H. van Wees and M. Whitby (eds), *Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare* (forthcoming) and H. van Wees, *Greek Warfare. Myths and Realities* (London 2004) 3-42.

[8] For a review of the scholarship, J.E. Lendon, 'Primitivism and ancient foreign relations', *CJ* 97 (2002) 375-84.

Greece of his day, a sentiment famously expressed in his resigned conclusion to the *Hellenica*, about the aftermath of the battle of Mantinea (362 BC):

> Since nearly all of Greece had come together and was arrayed against each other, there was no one who did not think that, if there were a battle, the victors would rule, and the defeated would be subjects. But the god so ordered it ... that while both sides claimed that they had won, neither was revealed to have anything more of territory or cities or rule than before the battle came about. And there was even more disorder and confusion in Greece after the battle than before. I've written this far. Perhaps some-one else will concern himself with what happened afterwards. (7.5.26-7)

Xenophon's despair grew from a life that had witnessed the collapse of the supremacies first of Athens, then of Sparta (which he favoured), and finally of Thebes. Xenophon's Greece was the site of many battles and victories, but a land where winners found it next to impossible to convert victory into enduring control – with ceaseless war as the result.[9] Stability and peace could be achieved, Xenophon thought: and he offered the reader of his *Cyropaedia* his thoughts on how to do it. But his advice would produce no happy commonwealth of equal and independent states: stability depended on the efficacy of a single ruling power. Such was Xenophon's sombre prescription for the free states of Greece.[10]

Xenophon offers his theory of domination at nearly the first appearance of the young Cyrus on the international stage, when the author describes him suppressing a rebellion in Armenia. He sketches the dramatic background. Astyages, king of the Medes and Cyrus' grandfather, had in his time conquered Armenia. But having done so, he left the king of Armenia to rule over his land while binding him by covenant to pay tribute, to follow Media in war, and to erect no fortifications.[11] When Astyages died, he was succeeded by his son Cyaxares. When Cyaxares' Media was attacked by Assyria, the king of Armenia 'despised' (καταφρονεῖ) Cyaxares and promptly cast off the Median yoke, failing to provide the owed tribute and soldiers, and fortifying his palace (2.4.12, 22). Enter now the young Cyrus, son of Cyaxares' sister Mandane, the princess who was married to Cambyses, king of the Persians, neighbours to the Medes and subject to them. Cyaxares summoned Cyrus to lead the Persian contingent to the aid of the Medes in the war (1.5.4-5). Asking Cyaxares for a force of soldiers, Cyrus volunteered to deal with the defection of the Armenian king, and compel him to 'send the army and render up the tribute to you, and also, I hope, make him more of a friend to us than he is now' (2.4.14; *cf.* 3.1.31).

Moving quickly under the cover of a hunt, Cyrus took the Armenian king by surprise, and captured both him and his family. Even before his capture the king was troubled: he knew he had acted unjustly (ἀδικοίη) by refusing the troops and the tribute (3.1.1-2). Once Cyrus had him in his power, Xenophon has the Persian prince cross-examine his captive, taking the opportunity to drum into his reader the Armenian king's consciousness of his guilt. Was there a war of old? Yes? When you lost it, did you not agree with Astyages to provide troops and tribute and not fortify your possessions? Yes. Why have you failed to do so? 'I wanted liberty. I thought it noble (καλόν) to be free myself and hand down liberty to my children' (3.1.10). It is noble, replies Cyrus, to protect freedom when you have it; but everything was changed once you became the slave of the king of Media. How do *you* deal with a runaway slave? 'I punish him'. And if a subject magnate and great proprietor tries to defect to the enemy? 'I execute him'. So

[9] On Xenophon's horror of domestic or international 'disorder', J. Dillery, *Xenophon and the History of his Times* (London 1995) 27-38.

[10] *Cf.* Xenophon's pessimism about the new federal states arising in Greece, notionally made up of equal partners, C. Bearzot, *Federalismo e autonomia nelle Elleniche di Senofonte* (Milan 2004).

[11] *Cyr.* 3.1.10. Two of these terms will certainly have reminded Xenophon's readers of the terms that victorious Sparta imposed upon Athens in the wake of the Peloponnesian War, Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20. The king of Armenia is never named; nor are the two successive kings of Assyria, Cyrus' enemies.

what should I do with you? asks Cyrus. And by his mortified silence king confesses that it is just and proper that he should be executed and his property seized.[12]

Cyrus and the king of Armenia do not debate the ethics of the situation: they agree. Xenophon stages this introductory exchange to show how weak a treaty or contract alone is in the face of the human longing for freedom, and how unstable a basis for domination.[13] The king of Armenia knows that he is doing wrong, but he rebels anyway. He does not argue that the treaty was imposed by strength and thus is not binding, nor that his right to freedom trumps his duties under it (both arguments a modern reader might expect). With his reader reminded not to put too much faith in covenants between states (*cf.* Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.35-6; Thuc. 4.19.2), Xenophon moves on to explain how successful domination of another state *can* be achieved.

The king of Armenia stands silent, consumed by guilt and terror. But present as well is the king's son, Tigranes, an old hunting companion of Cyrus' (3.1.7). And he argues for his father's life and throne. The dialogue that follows is introduced and marked by a striking breach of the oriental frame: 'Cyrus had noticed that, when Tigranes had gone hunting with him, a certain sophist accompanied him who was much admired by Tigranes; and so Cyrus was very keen to hear what Tigranes had to say' (3.1.14). This intervention alerts the reader to pay close attention to Tigranes' statements: Tigranes will be no colourless interlocutor,[14] and the reader is set to wondering whether Xenophon is granting Tigranes' arguments the sanction of the author – or the opposite. The mention of the sophist also alerts the reader to the applicability of the following dialogue to Greek affairs, by thrusting in a jarringly Greek character. So arrestingly introduced, Tigranes begins to speak.

Imposing sôphrosynê

If Cyrus spares the king, Tigranes maintains, and restores him to his position, the king will be, in the future, an ideal subordinate ruler. By his mishap, Tigranes explains, the king of Armenia has acquired *sôphrosynê*, the wisdom of self-control, while any replacement would be liable to the opposing vice (ἀφροσύνη), foolish lack of self-control, or, as a Greek would more usually put it, *hybris*.[15] Cyrus is perplexed: how can one acquire *sôphrosynê* – the supreme Greek virtue – so quickly? (3.1.16-17). Because defeat at least makes the defeated *sôphrôn* towards a specific victor. 'Have you never noticed, Cyrus, that when a man through ἀφροσύνη sets on to fight a stronger man than he, and is defeated, he straightaway stops his ἀφροσύνη towards that man. And again ... have you never observed how a city, arrayed against another city, when defeated at once wants to obey (πείθεσθαι) that other city rather than fight on?' (3.1.18). By introducing the *polis* for comparison, Xenophon alerts his reader again that this discussion has application to Greek affairs. And Tigranes' argument depends on shifting between two meanings of the broad Greek term *sôphrosynê*, between *sôphrosynê* as a moral quality possessed by the virtuous man, and *sôphrosynê* as something imposed on a defeated enemy, the sense it had in brawls between men and wars between states, where a state might hope to 'wise up' (σωφρονίζειν) an opponent by defeat, or after victory boast of having 'stopped' or 'quenched their *hybris*'.[16]

[12] *Cyr.* 3.1.11-13; *cf.* 3.1.21. Gera (n.1) 81-91 argues for the similarity of this exchange to Athenian legal procedure, and that this procedure also exerted influence on Socratic questioning, which this passage so closely resembles.

[13] On longing for freedom as a motivation in foreign affairs, *cf.* Thuc. 3.46.5, 5.100; van Wees (n.7) 22.

[14] *Cf.* Gera (n.1) 98, 'The Armenian and the Persian are ... evenly matched – there is no lone leading figure in the conversation, no "Socrates".'

[15] 'Αφροσύνη = *hybris* in this passage, *Cyr.* 3.1.21. The use of the rather odd word ἀφροσύνη is related to the passage's sophistic tone. Gera (n.1) 95-6 and C.J. Tuplin, 'Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*: education and fiction', in A.H. Sommerstein and C. Atherton (eds), *Education in Greek Fiction* (Bari 1997) 65-162 at 83-4, explicate this segment well. My understanding of *hybris* is that of N.R.E. Fisher, *Hybris* (Warminster 1992), as modified by D.L. Cairns, '*Hybris*, dishonour, and thinking big', *JHS* 106 (1996) 1-32.

[16] On *sôphrosynê* as a moral quality, see H. North, *Sophrosyne* (Ithaca 1966) with a brief discussion (131-2) of *Cyr.* 3.1.14-31, and A. Rademaker, Sophrosyne *and the Rhetoric of Self-Restraint* (Leiden 2005) with a brief dis-

Tigranes goes on to explain what produces this second, this directed *sôphrosynê*. First, a sense of the superiority of the victor, a sense that the victor is 'better' (βελτίων). This sense is not automatically produced by defeat, 'for he who is defeated by strength often thinks that, if he exercises his body, he may take up the struggle again, and conquered cities too think that, if they take on new allies, they might renew the struggle. But those who believe that others are better (βελτίους) than they, often obey them willingly and without constraint' (3.1.20). Cyrus replies that superiority alone has very little impact: bad men recognize others as their superiors, but are still bad: 'the hybristic recognize those more self-controlled (σωφρονεστέρους) than they' but it makes no difference (3.1.21). So Tigranes offers the second plank of his argument: fear. 'Does anything enslave men like powerful fear? Don't you know that those smitten with the sword – thought the greatest punishment – nevertheless want to fight the same people again, but men who fear someone greatly, can't look them in the eye even when they [the feared] encourage them?' (3.1.23). Fear, Tigranes goes on to argue, is a more powerful deterrent than actual punishment.[17] What happens, Cyrus objects, when the fear is turned off? Won't a man who has shown *hybris* in success before, and is now abject in defeat, quickly revert to arrogance (μέγα φρονεῖν) (3.1.26)? Fear must be made perpetual, Tigranes replies, by installing garrisons and the like: the problem is that such measures make enemies, or would, if it were not for the correct management of reciprocity (3.1.27-9): and here Xenophon launches into his final lesson, which we will take up below.

Superiority

Neither Xenophon's way of thinking about men being 'better' than one another nor his way of thinking about fear is native to the intellectual realm of foreign affairs: Xenophon imports both. The theory of obedience to the better descends from Greek heroic ethics.[18] In the *Iliad* the claim to be 'the best of the Achaeans' carries with it the claim to be obeyed by others, and not to obey others. So when Achilles sneers at Agamemnon's claim ('he boasts himself by far the best of the Achaeans', 1.91), accuses Agamemnon of cowardice (1.226-8), and claims superiority for himself ('you will eat out the heart within you in sorrow, that you did no honour to the best of the Achaeans', 1.243-4),[19] Agamemnon detects in Achilles ambition to take over his own position as supreme chief:

> Here is a man who wishes to be above all others,
> who wishes to hold power over all, and to be lord of
> all, and give them their orders ... (1.287-9)[20]

The principle of obedience to the best is not in dispute: the question is who is best, who possesses more of the stuff of superiority, *timê*, honour or worth. Nestor tries to argue to Achilles that although Agamemnon is an inferior warrior, he has more:

cussion of σωφρονίζειν (290-1). For *sôphrosynê* in Xenophon, B. Schiffmann, *Untersuchungen zu Xenophon – Tugend, Eigenschaft, Verhalten, Folgen –* (Göttingen 1991) 49-60. Dillery (n.9) identifies *sôphrosynê* as a major theme in the *Hellenica*, where cities and régimes thrive or collapse depending on the presence or absence of *sôphrosynê* in the state. For σωφρονίζειν in foreign relations, Thuc. 6.78.2; Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.23; *Cyr.* 3.1.27; 'stopping', 'quenching' *hybris vel sim.* Dem. 9.1, 19.325; Aeschin. 2.104; Isoc. 12.47, 61, 83, 196; with J.E Lendon, 'Homeric vengeance and the outbreak of Greek wars', in H. van Wees (ed.), *War and Violence in Ancient Greece* (London 2000) 1-30 at 14.

[17] *Cyr.* 3.1.24-5. Fear also suppresses the consequences of 'hatred' (Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15), which is another stage of the revenge cycle, Lendon (n.16) 15.

[18] For this conception in Homer, see H. van Wees, *Status Warriors* (Amsterdam 1992) 69-77, and D.F. Wilson, *Ransom, Revenge, and Heroic Identity in the* Iliad (Cambridge 2002) 55-64.

[19] The *Iliad* passages are trans. Lattimore, sometimes adapted.

[20] On Agamemnon's lack of acknowledged authority, see O. Taplin, 'Agamemnon's role in the *Iliad*', in C. Pelling (ed.), *Characterization and Individuality in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1990) 60-82 at 62-5.

> Nor, son of Peleus, think to match your strength with
> the king, since never equal with the rest is the portion of honour (*timê*)
> of the sceptred king to whom Zeus gives magnificence (*kudos*). Even
> though you are the stronger man, and the mother who bore you was immortal,
> yet is this man greater who is lord over more than you rule. (1.277-81)[21]

But Achilles does not accept Nestor's argument. To obey Agamemnon is to admit inferiority:

> So must I be called of no account and a coward
> if I must carry out every order you may happen to give me. (293-4; *cf.* 1.231)

Even if they cannot agree on who has the most *timê*, the Achaean heroes agree that *timê*, superiority, lies at the heart of rulership.

This theory of rulership by superiority is common in Xenophon. The commander of the Athenian cavalry, he insists, earns the right to have his orders obeyed by being superior in every military skill.[22] And Xenophon presents this same superiority as crucial to military command in the *Cyropaedia* – one can encourage and compel obedience with reward and punishment, but far better is the willing obedience that soldiers give those who are better than they at soldierly accomplishments. Xenophon repeatedly represents this also as an essential principle of rulership over Cyrus' empire: thus, for example, even after becoming an imperial people Cyrus wants the Persians to stick with their old, austere ethics, because they must 'rule over the ruled as their betters'.[23] Nor was Xenophon alone in having inherited this concept from epic, at least among the oligarchically minded: Aristotle echoes it (Arist. *Rhet.* 1378b-79b; *Pol.* 1284a-b). But the doctrine is not well represented in the Attic orators, addressing the Athenian democracy: here Xenophon's politics made him stand apart from his countrymen.

In the *Cyropaedia* Xenophon adapts this venerable conception of obedience between individuals to relations between states. Other Greek authors casually did so as well. In Herodotus, when Gelon of Syracuse offers the Greeks facing Xerxes a great armament, but on condition that he hold the command, the Spartans reject his request with an allusion to Agamemnon, and the Athenians, when he bargains instead for command on the sea, reject it not only because of their large force of sailors, but also because of the antiquity of their state and the Athenian hero Menestheus, in the *Iliad* supreme at marshalling armies. Both Sparta and Athens claim to be Gelon's betters, and so it is proper that he should obey them, not the other way round.[24] Greek authors can apply the same logic to men ruling men and states ruling states because the Homeric conception of heroes as ranked from best to worst – and thus some 'better' than others – had long been applied by Greeks to their city-states: thus the famous crushing reply from Apollo at Delphi to small Aegium when, after a petty victory, the city had asked, 'who were the best of the Greeks?'

[21] *Cf.* Hom. *Il.* 1.175 for Agamemnon receiving *timê* from Zeus. Hom. *Il.* 12.310-21 (the speech of Sarpedon to Glaucus) is the classic Iliadic expression of the need to justify privileges by martial excellence, and Xenophon echoes it at *An.* 3.1.37; *cf.* Dillery (n.9) 74; but see *Oec.* 21.5-7 for a different view.

[22] Xen. *Eq. Mag.* 6.4-6; cf. *Mem.* 3.3.9-10, 3.5.21-3.

[23] Reward and punishment, *Cyr.* 1.6.20; cf. *Oec.* 5.15, but superiority better, *Cyr.* 1.6.21-5; empire, quoted *Cyr.* 7.5.78, *cf.* 7.5.83, 8.1.37. For this theme, E. Scharr, *Xenophons Staats- und Gesellschaftsideal und seine Zeit* (Halle 1919) 190-206; J. Luccioni, *Les Idées politiques et sociales de Xénophon* (Paris 1947) 54; Breitenbach (n.3) 1728-9; P. Hunt, *Slaves, Warfare, and Ideology in the Greek Historians* (Cambridge 1998) 147-53.

[24] Hdt. 7.159-61 with J. Wickersham, *Hegemony and Greek Historians* (Lanham, MD 1994) 4-14; *cf.* Hdt. 7.5; Thuc. 2.41.3 and 6.83.1 with Lendon (n.16) 17. But Thucydides can also have speakers sneer at this logic: 5.89.

> The best of all land has Pelasgian Argos,
> the best horses the Thessalians, the best women the Lacedaemonians.
> Those who drink the water of fair Arethusa are better men,
> but still better than they those who live between Tiryns and Arcadia rich in flocks:
> the Argives in their armour of linen, the goads of war.
> But you, men of Aegium, you are neither third nor fourth
> nor twelfth: you are not on the list.[25]

However reluctant Athenian democrats might be to apply this timocratic principle within the city-state, they were just as happy as oligarchs to apply it to nations. However democratic at home, democratic Athens was a gigantic aristocrat in the international arena.[26] If a state could prove itself 'better' than another, and bring home to that other state a vivid sense of its inferiority, a strain of Greek thinking suggested that obedience to the better should result.[27] The victor in war sought to inspire in the defeated a realization parallel to the admission Xenophon has the defeated Croesus make to Cyrus:

> I accepted the command because I thought I was fit to be the greatest; but I didn't know myself. How could I think myself fit to fight you? You who ... are sprung of the gods, born of the line of kings, and who have practised virtue since childhood. Of my ancestors, I gather, the first to rule was both a king – and a freed slave. (7.2.23-4; *cf.* 5.2.20)

Xenophon's sense that victory must result in such an admission of inferiority explains why, elsewhere in the *Cyropaedia*, he is concerned about not merely the fact, but also the manner of victory in battle. When a character urges an attack upon a small and vulnerable group of enemy soldiers, Cyrus contradicts him: better to wait for them all to assemble. 'If less than half of them are defeated, be sure that they will say that we attacked a few because we feared the mass of them, and so they will not consider themselves defeated, and you will have to fight another battle' (3.3.47; *cf.* Thuc. 6.11.6). Here lies a possible explanation for the puzzling Greek sense of 'fair play' in war, famously pointed out as characteristic of the Greeks by a Persian character in Herodotus.[28] The Greek ideal of letting the opposing army gather and having a battle on the plain between the full forces of each side, almost as if by appointment, can be seen as grounded in the belief that the desired inculcation of *sôphrosynê* in the defeated could only be achieved by such a 'fair and open' battle.[29]

Fear and contempt

According to Xenophon's Tigranes the necessary partner of superiority was fear. Xenophon's conception of the operation of fear in foreign affairs is borrowed from his general understanding of human psychology, which he develops most fully in the context of morale in battle, Xenophon

[25] Delphic oracle, H.W. Parke and D.E.W. Wormell, *The Delphic Oracle* 2: *The Oracular Responses* (Oxford 1956) no. 1 = J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1978) no. Q26. On this habit of ranking states, see Lendon (n.16) 13-14; van Wees (n. 7) 22-3; adding Dem. 8.72; 10.46-7, 52, 71, 74; 18.63, 200; Isoc. 12.70, 14.5.

[26] On Athens collectively as an aristocrat, N. Loraux, *L'Invention d'Athènes* (Paris 1981); J.E. Lendon, *Soldiers and Ghosts. A History of Battle in Classical Antiquity* (New Haven 2005) 62-3 with n.10; 406-7.

[27] An especially prominent theme in Isocrates (*Or.* 4, 8 *passim*, with J. de Romilly, *The Rise and Fall of States According to Greek Authors* (Ann Arbor 1977) 67).

[28] Hdt. 7.9; and *cf.* later statements of the formality of Greek warfare, Dem. *Or.* 9.48; Polyb. 13.3.2-6. For the Greek dichotomy between fighting 'openly' and trickery, E. Heza, 'Ruse de guerre – trait caractéristique d'une tactique nouvelle dans l'oeuvre de Thucydide', *Eos* 62 (1974) 227-44 at n.10. The existence of this sense of fair play in Greek warfare is controversial: for the literature, Lendon (n.26) 401-2, 410-11.

[29] 'Fair and open', Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.16; *cf.* Andoc. 3.18; Isoc. 15.118. Defeat by strategy, etc., not regarded as real defeat: Hdt. 1.212; Dem. 60.21; Plut. *Pel.* 15.4-5; Polyb. 13.3.3; Arr. *Anab.* 3.10.3.

being the most systematic Greek thinker about military morale whose work survives, and the *Cyropaedia* being the work in which he expounds his theory most systematically.[30] The Greek habit of regarding both army and *polis* in an anthropomorphic light (the same habit that allowed *poleis* to be ranked like Homeric heroes) allows the same theory of human psychology to work in the realms of both military morale and relations between states. Armies and states feel *en masse* the same emotions that individuals feel.[31]

Xenophon understands the morale of an army as a dichotomy between high spirits, θάρσος, εὐθυμία or προθυμία, and low, ἀθυμία or φόβος, fear.[32] A general must 'be able to instil high spirits (προθυμίαν) in an army [because] in every undertaking high spirits or low (προθυμία ἀθυμίας) make a tremendous difference'.[33] Low spirits and fear lead to flight and defeat; the alternative, high spirits, lead to victory. And so 'if we make them more afraid (φοβερωτέρους) and our side bolder (θαρραλεωτέρους), I think it would be a great advantage for us, and so reduce the danger for us and increase that for the enemy'.[34] Yet however valuable, high spirits must be carefully managed: closely associated with high spirits is contempt or scorn for the enemy (καταφρόνημα, καταφρόνησις), which can be decisive in battle (and which a general might therefore want to encourage) but which is extremely dangerous for its possessors, because it can lead to unreasoning aggressiveness and unthinking arrogance: contempt is close kin to *hybris*.[35]

Contempt or despising appears in the international realm as well: this was the original emotion that the king of Armenia felt towards Cyaxares and the Medes when they were attacked by the power of Assyria; it was contempt that emboldened the king of Armenia to revolt, an act of *hybris* (2.4.12 with 22). In the international realm, too, contempt is closely linked to *hybris* and high spirits, and all are opposed to low spirits and fear.[36] Extending this parallel structure, in Xenophon's thinking fear produces *sôphrosynê*, the antithesis of *hybris*.[37]

Xenophon's psychology has only two registers, high spirits and low; *tertium non datur*. High spirits are dangerous in a neighbour because they imply contempt and *hybris*, and are likely to lead him to attack.[38] So the neighbour or subject must be kept in low spirits, in a perpetual state of fear (*cf.* Thuc. 6.11.6). The same gloomy principle applies, elsewhere in Xenophon, inside a city, a good thing for those planning a programme of reactionary moral reform. Defeat by Boeotia has 'humbled the glory' (τεταπείνωται ἡ δόξα) of Athens, and the Athenians dread invasion. And so 'it seems to me that the city is disposed in a manner pleasing to a good ruler. For boldness (θάρσος) creates carelessness, idleness and disobedience, while fear (φόβος) makes men more attentive, obedient, and disciplined' (Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4-5). Yet an orator, urging his state to action, must shake them out of this mortified condition: he must urge, convince or mock them, into 'thinking big' (μέγα φρονεῖν), another way of describing the state of high

[30] On Xenophon's understanding of morale, and his didactic programme about it, J.E. Lendon, 'The rhetoric of combat: Greek theory and Roman culture in Julius Caesar's battle descriptions', *Classical Antiquity* 18 (1999) 273-329 at 290-5.

[31] On states regarded anthropomorphically by Greeks, for literature, see van Wees, *Greek Warfare* (n.7) 6-18 and Lendon (n.16) 13-22.

[32] On the vocabulary of morale in Xenophon, see also Schiffmann (n.16) 85-96.

[33] *Cyr.* 1.6.13. For this binary conception of military morale in Xenophon, *cf.* 5.2.33, 5.3.47; *Hell.* 3.5.21-2.

[34] *Cyr.* 3.3.19. For the importance of high spirits in war, *cf.* 1.6.19; *An.* 3.1.42.

[35] Value of contempt in war, *Cyr.* 3.3.9, 3.3.31; cf. *Hell.* 3.4.19, 4.4.17; Hdt. 4.134; Thuc. 5.8.3; but contempt dangerous, Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.27, 4.1.17, 4.4.10, 4.5.12, 4.8.18, 4.8.36, 5.3.1, 7.1.18; Thuc. 5.9.3; contempt associated with *hybris* in war, Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22-4.

[36] Binary conception of spirits in a state: Thuc. 5.32.4, 6.63.2; Dem. 18.175; Isoc. 15.121-2. High spirits in a state, Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24, 5.2.37, 6.2.24; Thuc. 6.16.6. Low spirits in states: Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15; Dem. 18.185; Aeschin. 2.141. See nn. 40 and 45 for alternative ways of expressing these concepts. High spirits in a state = contempt, Thuc. 6.63.2; Dem. *Prooem.* 39.3 (and creates blunders).

[37] Fear creates *sôphrosynê*, Xen. *An.* 7.7.30. Fear cures contempt, Thuc. 6.34.7-8. Opposition of fear and contempt, Thuc. 6.49.2, 6.63.2.

[38] Aggression, Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4; cf. *Cyr.* 3.3.9-10; absence of contempt inclines a state to peace, Aeschin. 3.148.

spirits.[39] 'Either think small (ἔλαττον φρονεῖν) and mind your own business, or ready a greater force. If you were Siphnians or Cynthians or folk like that, I would advise you to think small, but because you are Athenians, I advise you to ready the force!' ([Dem.] 13.34).[40] But orators who wish to discourage action can be described as making the citizenry 'despise yourselves' (καταφρονεῖν [Dem.] 17.23).

In such a grim understanding of the psychology of international relations there is little place for 'peace process' or for confidence-building: the only relations states have to one another are relations of fear or contempt: foreign powers are 'at your feet or at your throat'. Xenophon was shortly to modify this dreadful logic, but other Greeks could extend it, as speakers in Thucydides sometimes do, arguing (as do the Mytileneans) that mutual dread is the only safe basis for alliance,[41] and that of allies 'whichever should first become high-spirited (θάρσος, a morale word) through a sense of security, would be the first to transgress against the other' (Thuc. 3.12.1), or that it was unwise (in Cleon's speech) to show any consideration whatever to subjects, lest they interpret it as weakness, feel contempt, and revolt.[42]

Xenophon's conflation, on the one hand, of *hybris* with high spirits and contempt, and on the other of *sôphrosynê* with discouragement and terror – his assimilation into a single binary structure of what appear to us the separate realms of individual and mass psychology, the motivations of states, and ethics – hints at the large rôle of irrational emotion in his theory of domination.[43] Neither *hybris* nor contempt nor fear is a fully rational disposition. It was a Greek commonplace that rapid increase in the power of a state would make that state practise *hybris*, to act beyond reason in an insulting fashion.[44] The same disposition could also be described as 'thinking big' (μέγα φρονεῖν) or being 'puffed up' (ἀναφυσᾶν): growing power might be augmented by pride in a state's history. Thus Xenophon portrayed the Arcadians of the 360s BC as 'puffed up' because of their numbers, their success in war and their belief that they were the only autochthonous inhabitants of the Peloponnese (*Hell.* 7.1.23-5).[45] So, too, Thucydides' Corcyreans became rich and powerful and associated themselves with the Phaeacians in Homer, and were accused of *hybris* (Thuc. 1.25.4; *cf.* 1.38.2-6). But this self-opinion is exaggerated beyond reason and intensely irritating to other states.[46] The same disposition also manifests itself as 'contempt' for other states (Thuc. 1.25.4), as in the case of Corcyra, but contempt can also be produced (as in the case of Media and Armenia) by another state's being perceived to decline in power: in either case a differential in perceived power results in contempt.[47] Just like high spirits in a battle, this is not a sombre, rational conception, deriving from careful calculation of relative forces. Rather, the contempt of one state for another, as of one army for another, is a red mist that destroys

[39] Dem. 13.25; *cf.* Plut. *Per.* 17; Thuc. 2.62.4-5, where Thucydides has Pericles urge contempt for their enemies on the Athenians. On μέγα φρονεῖν, see n.45.

[40] For ἔλαττον φρονεῖν, another near-synonym for low spirits and an antonym for *hybris*, *cf.* Isoc. 12.47, 167. Note also ταπεινότης (and related forms) 'abasement', 'humbleness', for the low state: Xen. *Hell.* 5.3.27; *Mem.* 3.5.4; Dem. 19.325 (= περιαιρεθῆναι τὴν ὕβριν καὶ τὸ φρόνημα); Aeschin. 2.136; Isoc. 14.37.

[41] Thuc. 3.11.1-2, 12.1; *cf.* 5.97.

[42] Thuc. 3.39.5; *cf.* 5.95, 6.18.3.

[43] This association of *hybris* with θάρσος and εὐθυμία is another way of understanding the unity between Fisher's (n.15) understanding of *hybris*, an insulting act or the disposition thereto, and D.M. MacDowell's ('Hybris in Athens', *G&R* 23 (1976) 14-31), 'having energy and power and misusing it self-indulgently' (30), to which drunk young men are especially prone. Bridging this gap is the purpose of Cairns (n.15).

[44] As a rule, Thuc. 3.39.4, 3.45.4, 4.18.2; de Romilly (n.27) 46-7. *Cf.* Hdt. 1.89, 5.91; Dem. 1.23.

[45] For μέγα φρονεῖν = *hybris*, Cairns (n.15) 11-17, although of course the term *hybris* is always pejorative, while μέγα φρονεῖν need not be. For ἀναφυσᾶν, *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.23 (synonymous with ἐνέπλησε φρονήματος, 7.1.23 and ἐμεγαλύνοντο, 7.1.24). The Greeks had other ways of expressing this concept too: φρόνημα, Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.18 (= *hybris* 5.2.38) and Dem. 19.325; ἐπαίρεσθαι, Hdt. 5.81 and Thuc. 5.14.2, 6.11.6; ἐπῆρται φρόνημα (contrasted with τεταπείνωται δόξα), Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4.

[46] Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.26, 44; Thuc. 6.18.4: Πελοποννησίων τε στορέσωμεν τὸ φρόνημα.

[47] Contempt from growing strength, *cf.* Hdt. 1.66; from another's declining strength, Thuc. 5.28.2 (= φρόνημα, 5.40.3). Θάρσος from appearance of weakness in an opponent, Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24.

rational calculation, exaggerating one's own strength and minimizing that of the enemy: thus its value in combat, and thus the danger it poses in the international arena.[48] Defeat in battle, or being forced to make peace, however little it may change the actual balance of power, produces disproportionate contempt (Thuc. 6.11.4-5; *cf.* Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.4). Small changes in relative strength can have a disproportionate potential to produce war, since they generate irrational contempt, which is so closely akin to *hybris*. Fear, at the same time, is closer to desperate panic than to rational weighing of hazards: time and again in Xenophon soldiers and states over-react from fear, and, naturally, statesmen devise ways to terrify their opponents and encourage their allies.[49] The abject terror to which Cyrus reduces the king of Armenia is not stage-dressing: it is a large part of the purpose of Cyrus' expedition (3.1.25). In Attic oratory, too, fear is extremely easy to inspire in states: so much so that Athens must be very careful not to terrify her allies inadvertently.[50] Thus the opposition between fear and contempt in Xenophon's theory of domination is not a rational theory of deterrence. It is theory of emotions, of psychology, of morale, in which the parties gyrate between unreasoning optimism and bumptious arrogance, and equally unreasoning terror and humility.

Reciprocity and generosity

Fear, Tigranes tells Cyrus, still arguing for his father's life and crown, must be permanent if domination is to continue, otherwise the subject will fall prey to *hybris*, and the ruler will have to 'wise him up' with war. But the methods that make fear permanent, 'building forts and holding strong places and whatever else you think trustworthy', create enemies and inspire hatred, which is (obviously) not what is wanted in a subordinate.[51] Tigranes' solution? Ensure that the people over whom you place garrisons are 'friends' – that is, persons who are in fathomless debt to you for favours: people like Tigranes' father, once he and his family have been spared and he has been restored to his throne. 'From whom could you ever get such friendship as you will get from us?'[52] The royal house of Armenia will be completely loyal forever. Favours weigh down the positive side of the relationship, garrisons the negative side. So it is safe to impose garrisons on those with whom you have a great positive credit, but not on those with whom you do not: beware lest such men become enemies.[53] Cyrus is pleased. He had promised Cyaxares that he would make the king of Armenia 'more of a friend', and he has done so; by conquering and sparing, he has placed the king in the deepest debt.[54]

The odd implication of this argument, that forgiven rebels will be more loyal than those whose loyalty has been continuous, is not lost upon Cyrus,[55] but this extreme valuation of gratitude was perfectly familiar to the Greeks. Herodotus reports that Polycrates, the tyrant of

[48] Irrational contempt in foreign relations: Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1; Thuc. 5.28.2, 6.11.5, 6.35.1 with 37.2, 6.49.2, 6.63.2. Irrational high spirits in foreign relations: Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.24, 5.4.46; Thuc. 6.11.6, 6.63.2; *cf.* Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.29.

[49] Soldiers, Lendon (n.30) 290-5; irrational terror in states, Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.15, 5.1.34, 7.4.14; *cf.* Hdt. 3.13; Thuc. 6.34.7-8, 6.49.2, 7.42.3. Contrive to terrify, Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.6; *An.* 7.4.1; Hdt. 7.235; Thuc. 6.49.2; encourage high spirits in allies, Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.2, 7.5.6.

[50] Dem. 23.103-6; Aeschin. 3.65; *cf.* Dem. 14.28.

[51] *Cyr.* 3.1.27. For fear producing hate, *cf.* Isoc. 15.121-2.

[52] *Cyr.* 3.1.28-9. As odd as gratitude for not being destroyed may seem, it appears elsewhere: at Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.13 an orator suggests that Athens acts in part out of gratitude to Sparta for not destroying her at the end of the Peloponnesian War; also 6.5.35.

[53] *Cf.* Thuc. 4.19.2. For calculating good and bad actions against each other in foreign affairs, *cf.* Dem. 16.13; Isoc. 5.37.

[54] On the Greek understanding of friendship in terms of reciprocity, L.G. Mitchell, *Greeks Bearing Gifts* (Cambridge 1997) 3-21. On the rôle of reciprocity between states in Greek foreign relations, L.G. Mitchell, 'Φιλία, εὔνοια, and Greek interstate relations', *Antichthon* 31 (1997) 28-44; A. Missiou, 'Reciprocal generosity in the foreign affairs of fifth-century Athens and Sparta', in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (eds), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1998) 181-97.

[55] *Cyr.* 3.1.28; nor upon scholars: Bizos (n.2) 9. But D.A. Cohen points out to me that placing great confidence in the loyalty of forgiven rebels was also commonplace in the Middle Ages.

Samos, used his fleet and archers against enemies and friends alike: 'for he would place a friend more in debt (χαριεῖσθαι μᾶλλον) by giving back what he had taken than if he never took it in the first place' (Hdt. 3.39). Xenophon represents Cyrus as persuaded by Tigranes' arguments, together with some final brass-tacks advice from Tigranes about the practicalities of not changing rulers in the middle of a war (3.1.30). And Tigranes' logic is retroactively vouched for by the fact that the 'sophist' who educated him turns out, shortly after the end of the dialogue and in elegant ring-composition with his introduction at the beginning, to have been executed by Tigranes' father for 'corrupting' the youth: an allusion to Socrates. So Xenophon indeed lends his authorial authority to Tigranes' position.[56] Tigranes' argument about reciprocity is, moreover, consistent with the emphasis placed on reciprocity all through the *Cyropaedia*, where it appears far more than any other tool of foreign relations.[57] Cyrus is constantly concerned to do favours for potential allies, expecting that they will reciprocate those favours.

An important ally of Cyrus' is the Assyrian rebel magnate Gobyras. He defects to Cyrus because of his longing for vengeance against the king of Assyria (about which more below) and pleads for a favour: that Cyrus help him gain his revenge (4.6.2-7). Cyrus replies, proffering him what is nearly a contract: 'if we do these things for you, and permit you to keep your walls and territory and arms and all the power you had before, what will you render to us in return for those things?' (4.6.8). When terms are agreed, they clasp hands and call upon the gods to witness (4.6.8-10; *cf.* 5.2.8). But this equal, contractual, arrangement is only the beginning: once Cyrus' army has marched through Gobyras' lands (fed there at Gobyras' expense) into the country of the enemy, Cyrus gives Gobyras a great gift of booty, 'to show straight away that we are endeavouring to defeat in benefaction those who are our benefactors' (5.3.2). Equality is not enough: Cyrus always wants to be ahead in the balance of favours; his strategy is one of generosity, or over-reciprocity.

Through the good offices of Gobyras, Cyrus also recruits the even more powerful Assyrian grandee Gadatas. Gadatas, too, yearns for vengeance against the Assyrian king, who had him castrated (5.2.28, 5.3.8-10). Gadatas opens the relationship by betraying to Cyrus a strategic fort, thus putting Cyrus in debt to him, and obliging Cyrus to play catch-up (5.3.15-19). So when the Assyrian king threatens Gadatas' land, Cyrus jumps to go to his aid, seeing an opportunity to requite Gadatas' favour, 'doing what is just and repaying a debt of gratitude', but also 'to show to everyone that we try to defeat in hurting those who hurt us, and to outdo our benefactors in doing good' (5.3.31-2), thus hoping to take the lead in doing favours away from Gadatas. And then Cyrus gives his officers a catalogue of reasons for this behaviour, from the purely practical to the ethical and emotional: first, it will encourage third parties to be friends and discourage them from being enemies. Second, if the Persians fail to reciprocate, then no one will ever do them a favour again. And third, they will feel shame if surpassed in benefaction by Gadatas (5.3.32-3; *cf.* 5.4.32).

With this catalogue, Xenophon situates the favour-trading of foreign affairs in the same mental universe as the favour-trading between individuals and the favour-trading by which Cyrus' government operates. Ultimately reciprocity between individuals is a moral duty enforced by shame, and so is the gratitude of a nation, as for example that of Armenia for Cyrus' driving the predatory Chaldeans off a strategic mountain.[58] The recipient of favours must also reciprocate

[56] *Cyr.* 3.1.38. Nadon (n.1) 79 n.34 gathers the modern references for the identification of the 'sophist' as Socrates.

[57] Tuplin (n.15) 84 grasps the seriousness of this argument from reciprocity. In general on reciprocity in Xenophon, see V. Azoulay, *Xénophon et les grâces du pouvoir* (Paris 2004).

[58] Shame, *Cyr.* 1.2.7; *cf.* Thuc. 4.19.3; Xen. *Hell.* 4.1.33-4, 6.5.42, 44; Xen. *Mem.* 2.10.3. Chaldeans, *Cyr.* 3.2.16. For the power of reciprocal bonds, the relationship between Cyrus the Younger and the mercenary captain Clearchus is exemplary: Xen. *An.* 1.1.9, 1.3.4, 1.3.10, 2.3.22-4 (shame).

for the practical reason that getting a bad reputation for failing to do so – a form of being 'unjust' in the Greek lexicon – will produce anger, ensuring that one never gets favours in future when one needs them.[59] In Herodotus, indeed, the fact of ingratitude for favours can even be a contributory reason for war.[60] So an opportunity to reciprocate in a spectacular public fashion, and so prove to the world that one is 'just' in this sense, is much valued (5.2.10-11; *cf.* Dem. 18.91). Given the strength of these imperatives, gratitude is expected.[61] And so the man in the street, the ruler and the diplomat all seek to place as many in debt as possible, out-doing the benefits of others with their own, so that they can call upon them at need.

Yet at the same time receiving more favours than one can bestow is shaming, because it is a sign of weakness and results in subordination (since the benefactor can call in the favours and thus control the recipient). This shame is what Cyrus fears in the wake of Gadatas' betrayal of the fort (*cf.* Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1124b). And there is another spectacular example of this phenomenon in the *Cyropaedia*. After tremendous victories and successes on behalf of the Median king Cyaxares, his uncle, Cyrus meets him and finds the older man furious.[62]

> These benefactions of yours are such that, the more of them there appear to be, the more they weigh me down! As for land, I would rather yours was extended by my power than to see mine increased in this fashion by you. These things are noble (καλά) for you to do, but somehow they bring me dishonour (ἀτιμίαν) ... And I, I think, not being a contributor to gaining these good things, am merely the recipient of benefits – like a woman – and to other men and even to my own subjects you appear the man, and I not worthy of my rule. (5.5.25-6, 33)[63]

It is dangerous for an inferior to threaten his superior with such shame (and crass for anyone to do so), and so the status of the balance-of-favour payments is apt to be misrepresented out of caution and tact. Thus when Gadatas almost falls victim to a plot, and Cyrus saves his life, Gadatas does not assert that Cyrus has now requited his benefaction in betraying the fort (which would imply how long Cyrus had languished in debt to him) but instead minimizes his own initial favour: 'you had received no benefaction from me, at least in a private capacity, but because you think that I've been of some advantage to your friends, you've come zealously to help me'.[64]

Failing in such tact is offensive and a diplomatic error, as Aristotle notes, referring to an unknown negotiation between Athens and Sparta where the Spartans graciously listed Athens' favours to them, and not the other way around (*Eth. Nic.* 1124b). And so Demosthenes maintained when he and Aeschines shared the embassy to Philip. In his speech to Philip Aeschines offered (among other provocative things) a detailed catalogue of Athens' many services to Philip and his father Amyntas (Aeschin. 2.25-9). Later, in private – Demosthenes having been too terrified to deliver his own speech – he nevertheless castigated Aeschines for his: 'you've so provoked Philip by your speech that rather than change war to peace, it would change peace to truceless war!' (Dem. 2.37; *cf.* 18.269).

The shaming quality of deep debt for favours or gifts is significant because it explains the rhetoric of equal exchange that is so often used in diplomatic speeches, either when offering a favour or asking for a return. This is politeness: real power inheres not in equal exchange, but

[59] *Cf.* Hdt. 7.158; Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.42; *Mem.* 2.2.14; Aeschin. 2.117. 'Unjust', Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.1-2.

[60] Hdt. 5.90-1; *cf.* 7.156; Dem. 5.5; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.12.

[61] *Cf.* Dem. 16.13, 17, and for the great power of such obligations in foreign affairs in Herodotus, J. Gould, 'Give and take in Herodotus', in id., *Myth, Ritual, Memory and Exchange. Essays in Greek Literature and Culture* (Oxford 2001) 283-303.

[62] On the alarming quality of receiving favours, *cf.* Azoulay (n.57) 60-8; G. Crane, *Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity* (Berkeley and Los Angeles 1998) 108-9. Euripides' *Alcestis* deals in part with this problem: M. Padilla, 'Gifts of humiliation: *charis* and tragic experience in *Alcestis*', *AJP* 121 (2000) 179-211.

[63] On the episode, Breitenbach (n.3) 1731-2. On the passage quoted, Tatum (n.1) 131-3; Gera (n.1) 106-9; Azoulay (n.57) 66-7.

[64] *Cyr.* 5.4.11. In a long relationship between states, who owes what to whom can be represented as is most convenient: Isoc. 5.36.

in getting the other party as deeply as possible in one's debt.[65] Real power inheres in what the Romans would call clientage (although they felt the same shame, and so rarely used the word 'client' of free men).[66] And whatever the diplomatic niceties, Greeks did not hesitate to place others as deeply in their debt as possible (Xen. *Ages.* 4.2-4; Arist. *Eth. Nic.* 1124b).[67]

It is with Xenophon's stress upon over-reciprocity that suspicion of *Perserie* presses hardest. Xenophon knew that the Great Kings of Persia were more lavish in their giving than was the custom of the Greeks: he traced that custom, indeed, to Cyrus, and observed that it persisted into his own day.[68] That relations of reciprocity were tremendously important between Greek individuals is abundantly established.[69] But is attributing such a large rôle to giving in rulership and foreign affairs Persian (or Persia imagined?), and not applicable to Greece? Yet in the *Hiero* Xenophon solves the problem of ruling in the same way: the Greek tyrant Hiero is urged to make his subjects love him by the gifts and benefits he confers upon them (7-11); and Xenophon's friend Agesilaus is described as ruling the Spartans thus to the extent that, legend had it, he was fined by the ephors for 'making the citizens his own property'.[70] Similar were the political tactics of Cimon and Nicias at Athens, and of the same origin the appeal of litigants in the Athenian courts of the fourth century for the jurors' gratitude in exchange for the litigants' expenditures on the city.[71] In foreign affairs Thucydides has Pericles in the funeral oration boast that uncalculating generosity, rather than careful equality of outgoing and incoming favours, was the policy that had made Athens strong.[72] In a decree a weak people might admit their profound debt to a stronger saviour and that 'for all time to come they will not leave off being grateful and doing whatever good they can'.[73] And in the *Hellenica* Xenophon has an orator urge the Athenians to store up favours when strong, just as an individual might, to call upon if they should become weak.[74] Scholarship has been tempted to identify this speech (6.5.38-48), placed in the mouth of Procles of Phlius, with Xenophon's own views; and the theme dovetails well with the speech of Callistratus (*Hell.* 6.3.10-17), also identified as a mouthpiece for the author, as well as with Xenophon's suggestions for Athenian foreign policy in the *Poroi* (5.5-13).[75] Fourth-century

[65] Here, as Azoulay (n.57) notes (52-60, 282-318), arise the mis-steps of Mitchell, *Gifts* (n.54) 6-21 and D. Konstan, *Friendship in the Classical World* (Cambridge 1997), who take equality as a necessary aspect of Classical Greek reciprocity and *philia* (friendship, in accord with Aristotle's definition of *philia*, *Eth. Nic.* 1157b, 1158b) and, in Mitchell's case, inequality as characteristic of Persians (pp. 111-33). Xenophon amply proves (as Azoulay illustrates) that reciprocity and *philia* could be understood to exist between unequals in Classical Greece. The agony that Aristotle undergoes to squeeze friendship between superiors and inferiors (whose inequality will extend to their giving) into this definition of friendship (*Eth. Nic.* 1158b-59a, 63a-b) shows that his position, upon which Mitchell and Konstan rely, must have been idiosyncratic.

[66] See J.E. Lendon, *Empire of Honour* (Oxford 1997) 63-9 for a discussion of Roman patronage in this sense.

[67] The same sense of great debt can apply to revenge as well: Hdt. 5.82 with Lendon (n.16) 15.

[68] *Cyr.* 8.2.7; *cf.* Hdt. 7.39, and for the realities of Persian gift-giving, H. Sancisi-Weerdenburg, 'Gifts in the Persian Empire', in P. Briant and C. Herrenschmidt (eds), *Le Tribut dans l'Empire Perse* (Paris 1989) 129-46.

[69] See Mitchell, *Gifts* (n.54), and the essays in C. Gill, N. Postlethwaite and R. Seaford (eds), *Reciprocity in Ancient Greece* (Oxford 1998).

[70] Xen. *Ages.* 1.18-19, 22; 5.1, 6.4, 11.13; *cf.* Plut. *Ages.* 4.3-4, 17.3, 20.4. Ephors, quoted, Plut. *Ages.* 5.2. On Agesilaus' patronage, P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (London 1987) 139-59; Azoulay (n.57) 305-10.

[71] Cimon, Plut. *Cim.* 10; Theopompus, *FGrHist* 115 F 89; Nicias, Plut. *Nic.* 3. Litigants: J. Ober, *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens* (Princeton 1989) 226-33, and Azoulay (n.57) 82-4 gather the references. Other instances of 'patronage' at Athens: Xen. *Mem.* 2.9.1-10.6; *Oec.* 2.5, 2.8, on which R. Zelnick-Abramovitz, 'Did patronage exist in Classical Athens?', *L'Antiquité classique* 69 (2000) 65-80; *cf.* Azoulay (n.57) 291-9.

[72] Thuc. 2.40.4-5, reading this difficult passage with J.T. Hooker, 'Χάρις and ἀρετή in Thucydides', *Hermes* 102 (1974) 164-9 at 167; *cf.* 6.18.2; Isoc. 14. On unequal reciprocity between Athens and her allies (discussing this passage), Azoulay (n.57) 76-8.

[73] Quoted, Dem. 18.92. Mitchell, 'Φιλία' (n.54) 38 collects epigraphic statements of indebtedness.

[74] Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.40; *cf.* 3.5.16, 5.2.3, 5.2.20, 7.4.10; Hdt. 1.61; and for an individual, Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.12.

[75] On the speeches of Procles and Callistratus, Dillery (n.9) 244-9 with literature. On the *Poroi*, J. Dillery, 'Xenophon's *Poroi* and Athenian imperialism', *Historia* 42 (1993) 1-11.

Athenians had special reason to value this strategy: after the Peloponnesian War, when Sparta's allies urged the destruction of the defeated Athens, the Spartans preserved her out of gratitude for Athenian actions in the Persian Wars (Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.20). The Attic orators take it for granted that states will act not only to pay back favours, but to lay others under an obligation, and that to accept favours can be dangerous, because they compel their recipient.[76] Another way to describe this store of built-up favours was as *eunoia*, 'goodwill', a quality ubiquitous in the orators as a tool, and therefore a goal, of foreign relations.[77] So the aggressive use of reciprocal relations in foreign policy should be regarded as wholly Greek: Xenophon was simply describing the methods of the Greek world he knew.

XENOPHON VERSUS THUCYDIDEAN REALISM

The Attic orators give a sense of the swirl of motivations that drove Greek foreign relations in the Classical period, placing before their public a dazzling array of claims for action or inaction in foreign affairs. Seek glory! Avoid disgrace! Avenge *hybris*! Act worthily of Athens! Be proud! No, avoid vainglory! Do favours! Repay favours! Scorn the favours of the wicked! Resist those who hate you! Resist monarchs, the natural foes of democracy! Resist oligarchs! Act nobly! No, take counsel of your weakness! Act justly! Act expediently! Do both at once! No, act justly rather than expediently: remember the gods and your reputation! No, act expediently rather than justly: justice is the right of the stronger! Help the wronged! No, don't meddle! Defend your land! Defend your freedom! Defend an enemy attacked by a greater enemy! Weaken the strong! Strengthen the weak! Maintain the balance of power! Be first city of Greece! No, give up your tyrannical empire! Hate the barbarians, the natural foe of Greece! No, ally with the barbarians! But no orator would ever need to reduce these claims to a orderly scheme: the orator riots in the garden of choices, plucking from the flowerbeds the stalks necessary to support, and the blooms necessary to adorn, his speeches.[78]

Xenophon tried to reduce these everyday Greek understandings of relations between states to a system for understanding foreign relations. To do so was to take an axe to a ball of string. Xenophon's three main themes – superiority, morale and reciprocity – necessarily separate for the sake of analytical clarity much that was joined in the Greek mind. Most Greeks did not so clearly distinguish either reciprocity or fear from superiority. Superiority was a mixture of reputation and practical power. Reputation was bound up with honour and shame: thus the behaviour of a state in the realm of reciprocity had an impact on its superiority. As we have seen, to receive too much brought shame, as did failure to reciprocate. But to give showed power, and so conferred superiority. Fear was shaming, disgraceful: a state of fear was a state of humility, the ruin of superiority; but its opposite, contempt or *hybris*, was understood to prompt (or be) an attack on the honour, and so the superiority, of another state. At the same time, to avenge the *hybris* of another, or to cause fear, showed superiority. There is nothing natural or inevitable in Xenophon's categories, and many of the ways Greeks thought about foreign affairs cut across his categories or combined them. But it is appealing to suppose that, with the striking 'sophistic' frame into which he places the dialogue between Cyrus and Tigranes – as indeed with his choice of a Melian-dialogue-style structure for his discussion – Xenophon is signalling his awareness

[76] Lay under obligation, Dem. 6.9, 15.11. Accepting favours dangerous, Dem. 6.8-12.

[77] *Eunoia* defined in reciprocal terms: Mitchell 'Φιλία' (n.54) 33-5; in Xenophon, Azoulay (n.57) 311 n.169. *Eunoia* called upon, Dem. 2.9, 8.66, 11.7, 15.4. Generally on *eunoia*, J. de Romilly, '*Eunoia* in Isocrates or the political importance of creating good will', *JHS* 78 (1958) 92-101.

[78] For discussion of these themes, and collections of references, P.A. Low, *Normative Politics in Greek Interstate Relations, 411-322 BC* (unpublished PhD diss. Cambridge 2001), her forthcoming book, and P. Hunt, *War, Peace, and Alliance in Demosthenes' Athens* (Cambridge forthcoming). The strongest theoretical statement of realism in Attic oratory is Dem. 15.28; *cf.* Arist. *Rhet.* 1358b.

of the problems associated with any such systemization, signalling that his formulation is, necessarily, a work in progress.

Many of the foreign-affairs motivations that appear in Xenophon and the orators also appear in Herodotus, and especially reciprocity in its positive (returning favour for favour) and negative (returning revenge for *hybris*) forms.[79] But Herodotus' comfort with over-determination (an event can have many causes, any one of which would have been ample to cause it) freed him from the need to create intellectual order among the causes he piled up: he offers no systematic theory of foreign affairs.

In contrast to Herodotus' collection of causes, Thucydides opted for reductionism. His ambition was to replace what lesser men thought about the causes of the Peloponnesian War with his own analysis. Thus his realist formulation of the 'truest cause ... the growing greatness of the Athenians, and the fear this inspired, which compelled the Lacedaemonians to go to war' (1.23.6). Many of the motivations that can be found in the orators and that Xenophon herded into his system, especially revenge and reciprocity, Thucydides deprecated as second-order causes – the 'grounds for complaint' and 'points of difference' (1.23.5): and, to the frustration of generations of scholars, Thucydides specified no clear relationship between his 'truest cause' and this second order of causation.[80] Thus, although Thucydides had a speaker identify fear, honour and interest as the three great motors in human affairs (1.76.2), he nevertheless nudged honour and interest aside when it came to diagnosing the causes of the Peloponnesian War: Thucydides was, ultimately, more comfortable with the operation of impersonal forces in history. Xenophon, by contrast, tried to accommodate all three motors into his general system, and give both personal and impersonal forces their due.

Xenophon offers a rebuttal of the crueller strains of realism expressed in Thucydides (or at least of the style of realist thinking that we associate with Thucydides because his work survives while those of his intellectual allies do not), a rebuttal especially of the cynical realist formulations that Thucydides puts in the mouths of some of his characters, for the realism Thucydides expresses in his own voice is milder.[81] Thucydides has Cleon describe Athens' rule over her allies as a tyranny (as his Pericles had as well, 2.63.2) based purely on strength, rather than on doing favours for the allies or the allies' sense of gratitude (3.37.2). That won't work, says Xenophon: using fear alone creates enemies, and the only resort is exactly the reciprocity that Cleon scorned.[82] Thucydidean realism, Xenophon implies, takes too limited a view of the psychological results of power: power produces fear, yes, but also anger and revenge.

More broadly, to Thucydides the essential currency of international relations – both as tool and problem – was power and the fear it produced. To Xenophon, as to Herodotus, it was honour and honour offended: *hybris*. In Xenophon, power could produce *hybris* in its possessor, and weakness induce *hybris* in others, but power or weakness were merely two of many potential

[79] For the range of causes Herodotus sees in foreign affairs, H. Immerwahr, 'Aspects of historical causation in Herodotus', *TAPA* 87 (1956) 241-80 at 251-64. For revenge, K.-A. Pagel, *Die Bedeutung des aitiologischen Momentes für Herodots Geschichtsschreibung* (Leipzig 1927), modified by J. de Romilly, 'La Vengeance comme explication historique dans l'oeuvre d'Hérodote', *REG* 84 (1971) 314-37; *cf.* R. Sealey, 'Thucydides, Herodotos, and the causes of war', *CQ* 51 (1957) 1-12. For positive reciprocity, esp. J. Gould, *Herodotus* (London 1989) 82-5; Gould (n. 61).

[80] On the tradition of interpretation of this passage, E.A. Meyer, '*The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War* after twenty-five years', in C.D. Hamilton and P. Krentz (eds), *Polis and Polemos* (Claremont, CA 1997) 23-54.

[81] On Thucydides' realism, Crane (n.62); for the distinction between Thucydides' two levels of realism, esp. 36-71, 237-93. For Thucydidean realism, see also P. Constantineau, *La Doctrine classique de la politique étrangère* (Paris 1997) 21-112, and esp. for the realism of Thucydides' speakers 57-83. I leave aside the question of whether Thucydides' later books unknowingly subvert the realism of Books 1 and 2, although I am sympathetic to the idea that they do: J. Ober, 'Thucydides *Theoretikos*/Thucydides *Histor*: realist theory and the challenge of history', in D. McCann and B.S. Strauss (eds), *War and Democracy* (Armonk, NY 2001) 273-305.

[82] *Cf.* Due (n.1) 225, and the speeches of Procles and Callistratus in the *Hellenica* and Xenophon in the *Poroi* (above, n.75).

roads to what was ultimately a moral fault and a psychological phenomenon, rather than a mechanical result of power differential. And Xenophon goes out of his way in the *Cyropaedia* to show that *hybris* is simply a stronger force in international relations than fear of power. For Xenophon not only shows how to suppress *hybris*; he shows how to use the *hybris* of others as well. In fighting the Assyrians, Cyrus repeatedly benefits from the fact that the *hybris* of his enemies makes potential allies yearn for revenge against them: it is in large part this yearning that allows the Persian to assemble a martial coalition. Hence the adherence to Cyrus of the Hyrcanians (4.2.1-4), and the Cadusians and the Sacae (5.2.25-7), in addition to Gobyras and Gadatas. In Gobyras' case Xenophon describes the full Greek emotional machinery of revenge: the misery, the vengeful hatred, the overwhelming shame that drives him (4.6.2, 7). And in the cases of Gadatas, the Hyrcanians and Gobyras, Xenophon takes the opportunity to point out that the yearning for revenge is stronger than rational, fear-of-power-based calculations: Gadatas' lands lay near Babylon, and so by revolting he had placed himself in acute peril. 'Why didn't you think of that before you revolted?' Xenophon has Gadatas ask himself. 'Because, O Cyrus, because of the *hybris* I had suffered and my anger, my soul did not keep looking out for the safest course, but always was pregnant with this: Would I ever be able to take revenge on that enemy of gods and men?' (5.4.35). Gobyras and the Hyrcanians were in terrible danger too, for fear of the Assyrian king's counter-revenge against their revolt. Cyrus observes to them that their stakes in the war were different from his own, and their danger greater, because the Assyrian king's hostility to Cyrus arose from balance-of-power considerations, and his hostility to Gobyras and the Hyrcanians from revenge. 'He is my enemy, not because he hates me, but because he thinks it would be bad for his interests if we became great, and so he campaigns against us for that reason. But you he hates, thinking that you have acted unjustly (ἀδικεῖσθαι) towards him' (5.2.24; *cf.* 5.3.30). The urge for revenge, Xenophon is saying, is a more powerful driver in foreign affairs than the rational calculation of interests.

The story of the two successive kings of Assyria drives home this lesson: the old king, as Xenophon presents him, analysed his position coldly in terms of relative power, in terms that would have been congenial to Thucydides: having seized Syria, reduced Arabia and Hyrcania to obedience, and attacked Bactria, he 'thought that if he could reduce the Medes to weakness (ἀσθενεῖς ποιήσειε), he could easily come to rule all those around, for he thought the Medes the strongest of the close-by tribes'. Deftly, in order to recruit allies, the king attributed his own ambitions to the Medes and Persians, 'saying that they were great and powerful nations, closely allied and intermarried, and they threatened, if no one anticipated them and broke their power (ἀσθενώσοι), to go against the nations one by one and subjugate them. And some, being won over by his words, made alliances with him, while others were seduced by gifts and money' (1.5.2-3). Just as in Herodotus and Thucydides, power is frightening, and to pre-empt the danger power poses is appealing.[83] But the ambitions of Assyria are destroyed by Cyrus, whose strength is based not upon such calculations of power and interest, but particularly upon reciprocity and the recruitment of those who yearned for revenge against the old king's wicked son. The moral imbalance between the two sides even brings in a distant party on Cyrus' side. This is the king of India, whose ambassadors have been sent to discover who is in the right, and who in the wrong, in the war between Media and Assyria. 'And the king of India bids us say to both of you that, when he has examined the justice of the case, he will support the side to whom injustice as been done (ἠδικημένου)' (2.4.7), and so indeed he did, sending Cyrus money at his request (3.2.28-9, 6.2.1-3). An insignificant episode in the *Cyropaedia*, but appeals for aid along exactly these lines – on the grounds that a city had been subject to injustice from another – are ubiquitous in the Athenian foreign relations revealed by Attic oratory.[84]

[83] Fear of power: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.15-17, 6.1.7; *cf.* 6.2.1, 6.2.9; Hdt. 1.46 with 71, 5.91; *cf.* 1.159, 3.1.

[84] Low (n.78) 143-9 gathers and discusses the references; see esp. Dem. 9.24-5; *cf.* Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.10.

CONCLUSION: XENOPHON'S PESSIMISTIC IDEALISM

To Xenophon the ultimate problem in international relations is *hybris*, contempt. This is a human frailty, but can be prompted in a neighbour by one's own weakness or his strength. So it is necessary to impose *sôphrosynê*, self-control, on the neighbour. This is done, first, by being 'superior' in a Homeric sense to the neighbour and, second, by keeping the neighbour in a state of fear. But imposing fear makes enemies, and its malign force must be counteracted by doing favours for the ruled, which, in the Greek lexicon, makes them 'friends'. The ruler must always be ahead in the calculus of favours, but that requires great tact, because doing favours that are beyond the ability of a recipient to repay can be conceived by the recipient as *hybris* as well. Thus a ruler must be superior, inspire fear, and be a tactful benefactor all at once. If a ruler is not superior, the ruled will practise *hybris* against him, which will manifest itself in revolt and war; if a ruler is weak and does not inspire fear, the ruled will feel contempt and practise *hybris* as well; if the ruler does not keep the ruled in debt to favours, the measures he employs to keep him in fear will cause war.

Xenophon was brought to write the *Cyropaedia*, he says, by contemplating how many governments had been overthrown and how difficult it was to rule men. Surveying Xenophon's theory of how one state may rule others, one sympathizes with his puzzlement. Domination is difficult and complicated: Cyrus could do it, but Cyrus was wholly exceptional among men. Although Xenophon's vision of statesmanship is less narrowly realist that Thucydides', it is no less pessimistic. This is not a world of free and friendly nations happily co-operating: peace only comes from having a ruling power, and that power must exert a cruel dominion. But even so, *hybris* is restless and irrational – Xenophon goes out of his way to make the point that *hybris* is a stronger force than rational calculation of interests – and a ruler less masterful than the exemplary Cyrus may have to spend a good deal of his time 'wising up' his subjects.

Xenophon for the most part lacked a separate box of intellectual tools to understand relations between states, and thus when he turned his mind to that subject, he reached for whatever tools he had handy. Yet he understood, too, that things often work differently between states from the way they did in the treasuries of metaphor upon which he drew. And so Xenophon is a coadjutor with Thucydides in struggling to *create* a separate mental realm of foreign relations. But unlike Thucydides, Xenophon was unwilling to jettison, in the interests of analytical simplicity, the disorderly mass of ways that his countrymen actually thought about relations between states, ways that themselves drew on everyday life and ethics. Instead he tried to reduce them – or as many as he could of them – to a system. Although Thucydides' account of relations between states is sleeker and more elegant, Xenophon's theory may better describe the Greek world they shared.

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